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Abstract 
The main purpose of this Dissertation is to examine a sample data of 108 matched 
pairs of failed and non-failed banks of Eastern and Western Europe., according to the 
size of total assets, over the 2006-2016 period. Techniques such as Multiple Logistic 
Regression and Multiple Discriminant Analysis based on Camel Rating System were 
applied on report data for one, two and three years prior to failure so as to determine 
the robustness of bankruptcy prediction models for European Banks. 
The logit Model predicts bank failure with 81,75% accuracy in comparison with the 
79,55% for the MDA Model, one year prior to bankruptcy. Nonetheless, MDA Model 
outperforms the Logit Model showing 72,44% accuracy two years prior to failure and 
67,06% accuracy three years prior to failure.      
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1. Introduction 
The global financial crisis has noticeably affected the European banking system. After 
the collapse of the Leman Brother in United States in 2008 the world and especially 
European Monetary Union has suffered the consequences with many state members 
taking austerity measures. The reason for those measures was not only the protection 
of the state and its banking system but also the protection of the whole European 
banking system as it was made clear that the European Monetary Union strongly 
depends on the healthy functioning of the currently weak European banking system. 
Until 2006, the banking system was one of the most profit-making sectors and a 
significant part of the economy chain. Nevertheless US, Asian and European 
economy faced the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of 1930.  The 
reasons that drove the global economy into a crisis were several, such as financial 
instruments which were hard to understand, the loose credit conditions, the United 
States housing market bubble, the easy credit conditions and the excessive debt 
burden. Also, the crisis has brought liquidity issues causing the change of the credit 
conditions all over the world. Since the crisis is still developing and continuously 
influences all the fields of the economy, the final effects of this phenomenon are still 
not visible. Free trade, protectionism, namely limits on imported goods or prices 
restrictions, lower consumer demands, fewer expanding markets and erratic currency 
fluctuations are only some of the consequences of the global financial crisis (Vitez, 
2017). 
Because of the above reasons, and because companies are being announced as 
insolvent rather too late, in order to secure the continuity of a bank’s activity, it is 
essential to value their financial condition constantly. During the last decade the 
interest of using early warning models has been increased because the application of 
this kind of models is one of the most simple as well as accurate ways to predict 
bankruptcy not only of banks but also of firms and SMEs on the whole. Overall, every 
firm can find the methodology, which is the most appropriate in order for it to value 
the stability of its activity. (Daiva Rugenytė Vida Menciūnienė Lina Dagilienė, 2010). 
Bankruptcy prediction is an issue of paramount importance. Credit officers, credit 
analyst and bankers are interested in bankruptcy prediction. Particularly, they aim to 
be among those who evaluate properly the bank’ s riskiness and the probability of 
loan default. This professional category seek to know how credit and financial 
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analysis, are related to Basel I/II/III accord and what changes should take place in a 
bank organization in terms of credit analysis, risk management with the application of 
the aforementioned Accords. In addition, financial analysts, credit analysts and fund 
managers are keen on knowing bankruptcy prediction models to understand a bank’ s 
riskiness when they make investment decisions. Also, it is very important for 
controllers, accountant managers and credit officers to take preventative actions in 
order to decrease the probability of default of a bank organization/client. Knowing 
what factors affect the probability of bankruptcy, how the analysis of financial ratios 
can be helpful so as to evaluate better a bank’ s credit worthiness is very essential for 
the academic field also.  
Nowadays, since the final consequences of the financial crisis phenomenon are not 
still visible there is a greater need for someone to be alert and to make the right 
decisions in good time. In order for a Banker, a credit officer and a manager to create 
value for their bank organization, they must know what precautionary measures 
should take so as to mitigate risk. What techniques/models (i.e. Logistic Regression) 
should be applied in order for them to determine the bank’ s probability of default and 
evaluate by this way the firm’ s riskiness. By knowing the previous, business 
environment executives will be a able to adjust their daily actions with a view to 
reduce market risk, credit risk and operational risk, taking into consideration that 
competition nowadays is becoming more intense.  
For this reason, the focus of this study is to apply bankruptcy prediction models and to 
define which variables depict accurately the performance of a bank, contribute to the 
bankruptcy prediction issue and how can someone benefit from it. The reason that we 
selected East and West European banks is because they are systemically important in 
a global level. Specifically their poor performance affects the banking system on the 
whole. Secondly, we preferred to study the topic of bankruptcy prediction from a 
broader perspective. (Janer, 2011) In addition, this study contributes in several issues 
of the bankruptcy prediction domain because it combines both practical and 
theoretical aspects of a bank’s life. It starts not only with literature review of studies 
related to bankruptcy prediction but also presents up-to-date information regarding 
Basel Accord and regarding the European Banking Framework. Several Statistic 
Models are used so as to provide different perspectives and additional observations of 
analysis and interpretation.  
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The dissertation consists of six chapters as follows and initially identifies the major 
risks that banks face The 1st chapter refers to the relevant literature and gives a 
picture of the theoretical background which links directly with bankruptcy prediction. 
A historical summary of the models is presented from the 1930 to nowadays.  
The 2nd chapter presents Basel I, Basel II and Basel III. The Basel Committee on 
Bank Supervision was founded in 1974 in order to “enhance the financial stability by 
improving supervisory knowhow and the quality of banking supervision worldwide”. 
Its role became more significant though the time and focused on the capital adequacy 
of banks and the banking system. Banks as any other company pass through many 
stages until they declare bankruptcy. During this period banks can take actions in 
order to prevent the bank failure and improve their image. In this section, we will 
refer in a non-technical way to the recommendations on banking regulations in 
regards to the risks that banks face, according to each Basel Accord. Finally, the new 
proposed capital and liquidity standards as well as three ratios for liquidity risk, 
funding risk and leverage deterioration valid since 2010, will be presented.  
The next session, chapter 4 discusses the European Banking Framework with 
emphasis on the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAS), the Single Rulebook and 
the Pillars of the Banking Union. 
Chapter 5 describes the sample data, which consists of 216 European Banks and 
chapter 6 presents the methodology, which was used so as to approach the empirical 
work. Furthermore we discuss financial ratios as predictor indicators, used in Altman 
Models (1968). Specifically we refer to the five key aspects, which constitute the 
CAMEL framework that is Capital Adequacy, Asset Quality, Management Capability, 
Earnings and Liquidity. The chosen statistic models are Descriptive Statistics, 
Univariate Stepwise Regression Analysis, Multivariate Logistic Regression Analysis 
and Multiple Discriminant Analysis. These models are able to predict the probability 
of bankruptcy. Banks as any other company pass through many stages until it declares 
bankruptcy.  
Chapter 6 refers to the empirical findings extracted from the whole process. Our 
purpose is also to point out the level of robustness of Multiple Regression Analysis 
and Multiple Discriminant Analysis by calculating apart from anything else Type I 
and Type II errors.  
 11 
 
Finally the 7th and last chapter presents the conclusions and the recommendations of 
the thesis presenting a summary of the work. Additionally, it refers to the limitations 
of this study as well as the need for further research and investigation.  
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2. Literature Review 
Bank failure represents the situation that banks are facing when they are unable to 
meet their obligations to their depositors or to other creditors. They fail to meet their 
liabilities, as the market value of their assets becomes less than the market value of 
their liabilities. Similarly, a business failure occurs when a firm is unable to perform 
and meet its liabilities to suppliers, employees, banks etc. Following the legal 
procedures, banks and companies have to file for bankruptcy in order to liquidate their 
assets and repay as much of their debt as they can. Another choice is to merge with 
other healthy banks or companies respectively or proceed to a restructure.  
We have to note at this point that the treatment opposite to a failed bank and a failed 
private company is different. There are people who believe that there shouldn’t be a 
distinction between them but there are also supporters of the assistive behaviour 
against banks, who claim that the failure of the bank can cause financial stress not 
only through bank panic but also by the direct and indirect costs that arise through the 
bankruptcy process. (Moulton and Thomas, 1993). For example, many banks were 
bailed out with public money through the crisis that began 2007-2008, as they 
considered too big to fail. The national treatment of the crisis led to the failure of 
several banks. Thus, in 2014 the European Commission introduced the EU Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Directive as a bank-restructuring program. Because of the 
many risks that the corporations are subjected and the impact that they have in the 
general economy as described above, an urgent need occurred to understand the 
reasons that cause the failure and protect the investors.   
Since 1930 several authors have attempted to find a formula to predict companies' 
failure with more modern techniques appearing during the 1960's. Therefore there is a 
great variety of models that use different factors, different number of factors, different 
type of factors: qualitative or quantitative and also with a different field of interest 
factors. They can be classified into three categories: the statistical models, the 
theoretical models, and the Artificially Intelligent Expert System (AIES) models 
(Aziz and Dar, 2006). The statistical models consist of both multifactor and single 
factor models. The theoretical models are a combination of quantitative statistical 
models and qualitative factors that lead to bankruptcy. Finally, the Intelligent Expert 
System models use mostly multivariate techniques with the assistance of the 
technological evolution. They can also be classified into two categories depending on 
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whether they use parameters or not: Parametric Techniques (single discriminant 
analysis, multiple discriminant analysis, logit models, Probit Models) and Non-
Parametric Techniques (neutral networks, recursive portioning algorithm). 
The primary studies on the bankruptcy prediction that were actually the first efforts 
for preventing the banking failure were univariate. They used to compare the failed 
companies’ individual ratios with those of the successful ones. Those models did not 
provide notably accurate results. Nevertheless they constituted the basis for the future 
multivariate models. (Horrigan, Bellovary et al., 2007) 
In 1930 the study by the Bureau of Business Research took place disclosing 24 ratios 
from a sample of 29 firms. According to this research the main ratios that a company 
should take into consideration in order to avoid failure were: the Current Ratio, 
Working Capital to Total Assets, Surplus and Reserves to Total Assets, Fixed Assets 
to Total Assets, Net Worth to Total Assets, Cash to Total Assets Sales to Total Assets 
and Net Worth to Fixed Assets, with more emphasis given to the Working capital to 
Total Assets. (Bureau of Business Research, 1930) 
In 1932, following the Bureau' s study, Fitz-Patrick presented a study of 20 pairs of 
firms. Each pair consisted of one surviving and one failed company with the same 
size belonging to the same industry. He used and analyzed thoroughly thirteen ratios 
without using statistical models. As it was expected the surviving companies’ ratios 
we better than the failed ones. He also discovered that two important factors were the 
Net Worth of Debt and the Net Profits to Net Worth ratio. (Fitz-Patrick, 1932) 
The same analysis was conducted also from Smith and Winakor in 1935, which 
reached the same conclusion as Bureau of Business Research. They observed a 
common tendency to the Working Capital to Total Assets and Current Assets to Total 
Assets of the failed companies. 
In 1942 Merwin published a similar study comparing pairs and he reached to the 
conclusion that failed companies were revealing alarming signs even 5 years prior to 
their failure.  (Merwin, 1942) 
Chudson (1945) and Jackendoff (1962) proceed also in two studies that were not 
focusing on the failure prediction. They reported that the prediction models should 
concern a specific industry and that the more profitable companies have higher 
Working Capital to Total Assets and Current ration.  
In 1967 Beaver introduced a more sophisticated analysis. He looked into thirty ratios 
of 79 pairs of public companies. Subsequently, he run statistical hypothesis tests (t-
 14 
 
tests) to evaluate the predictive ability of each ratio. The results were outstanding. The 
Net Income to Total Debt ratio had the higher predictive ability by reaching 92%. The 
next four best indicators were really close to the first one: the Net Income to Sales 
ratio reached 91%, while the Net Income to Net Worth, Cash Flow to Total Debt, and 
Cash Flow to Total Assets ratios reached 90% accuracy. In addition, Beaver 
proceeded to the innovative theory that a prediction model might be more accurate by 
using more than one variable. (Beaver, 1967) 
The most famous methodology that developed in 1968 is known as the Altman’ s Z 
score and it used until today. Altman introduced the first multiple discriminant 
analysis (MDA). He used 22 financial ratios for his research in a sample of 33 listed 
surviving companies but he concluded to the following equation. (Altman, 1968) 
 
Z = 1.2 Z1 + 1.4 Z2 + 3.3 Z3 + 0.6 Z4 + 0.999 Z5 
Where,  
Z1 = Working Capital to Total Assets 
Z2 = Retained Earnings to Total Assets 
Z3 = EBIT to Total Assets 
Z4 = Market Value of Equity to Book Value of Total Liabilities  
Z5 = Sales to Total Assets 
 
If Z > 2.99 then the company belongs to the Safe Zone 
If  1.81< Z > 2.99 then the company belongs to the Grey Zone 
If Z < 1.81 then the company belong to the Distress Zone with high bankruptcy 
probability within 2 years. 
 
After testing the model the conclusions were that its accuracy was 95% high for the 
first year prior to bankruptcy and it was also reducing as the years were passing by to 
72% the second year, 48% the third year, 29% the fourth year and 36% the fifth year. 
Later in 1972 Deakin decided to compare the Altman ‘s and the Beaver ‘s method. He 
conducted this research by using the Beaver’ s method ratios and trying to find a 
linear connection between those. He also used a random sample of 11 failed and 23 
living companies. The model proved to have prediction accuracy from 97% the first 
year prior to bankruptcy to 79% the fourth year and 83% the fifth year. He reported 
that an AMD analysis is a better classifier than the univariable analysis. He also 
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reported that according to his research the Cash flow Coverage to Total Debt was of 
great importance. At the same year, Edminister conducted an empirical analysis of 
small and medium sized companies' ratios, which led to an MDA model with seven 
factors that reached the accuracy of 93%. The innovation was that he divided the 
ratios with the industry average ratios, which proved to be effective. (Deakin, 1972) 
In 1977 Altman revised his method together with Haldeman and Narayanan and they 
reached classification accuracy of 96% for the first year prior to bankruptcy, by using 
Return on Assets (ROA), Stability of earnings. Debt Service, Liquidity, Size, 
Capitalization and Cumulative Profitability. (Altman et al., 1977) 
In 1980 Olson expressed a different opinion against the MDA. He supported that the 
MDA method is based on two assumptions: the independent variables are normal for 
all the variables and homogeneity of variances. In addition, the sample of the firms is 
subjective and the results can be pursued during the process. Olson used a much 
larger sample (105 bankrupt and 2058 non-bankrupt industrial firms) without pair 
matching and 9 ratios. He conducted a logit analysis, which did not allow 
assumptions. (Olson, 1980) 
Y = -1.3-0.4 Y1 + 0.6 Y2 - 1.4 Y3 + 0.1 Y4- 2.4 Y5- 1.8 Y6 + 0.3 Y7 - 1.7 Y8 - 0.9 Y9 
Where: 
Y1 = log (Total Assets to GNP price level Index) 
Y2 = Total Liabilities to Total Assets 
Y3 = Working Capital to Total Assets 
Y4 = Current Liabilities to Current Assets 
Y5 = 1 if Total Liabilities > Total Assets or 0 otherwise 
Y6 = Net Income to Total Assets 
Y7 = Funds provided by operations to Total Liabilities 
Y8 = 1 if Net income < 0 for the last two years or 0 otherwise 
Y9 = change of Net Income 
0>Y>1 
If Y is close to 1 then there is a small probability of bankruptcy. If Y is close to 0 then 
there is a high probability of bankruptcy. 
In 1993 Altman introduced the Z score model to private firms and in 1995 he 
restructured it in order to be able to use it in non-manufacturers and emerging markets 
by excluding the asset turnover ratio. In addition he recalculated the primary method’ 
s coefficients.  
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The classification accuracy of this model was 96.3% for a year prior to the failure.  
In 1998 a new study was conducted, which was focused on one single industry. 
(Bhargava et al., 1998) The study presented the comparison among the Altman’s Z 
score, the cash flow factor and the inventory turnover factor for companies from the 
retail sector, by using a logit model.  At the time the two last factors were considered 
to be of high importance for the bankruptcy prediction of the retail industry. The 
prediction accuracy was proved to be higher for the Z score than the cash flow and the 
inventory turnover. The less relevant factor was the inventory turnover.  
During the last year intelligence techniques have been introduced. The most popular 
are the Neural Networks (NN) (Demyanyk and Hasan, 2010). This method is based 
on the imitation of the human nervous system through an algorithm and thus it does 
not rely on specific assumptions and on linear approaches.  The drawbacks are that 
they can be more easily influenced by changes in the economic environment and it is 
difficult to understand. According to Charitou (2004) that used the neural and the logit 
methods combined, the Cash Flow, the Profitability, and the Financial Leverage 
variables could predict the failure with 83% accuracy one year before based on a 
paired sample of 51 firms. 
In addition, in 2006, Aziz and Dar presented the outcomes of investigating several 
pieces of research that concern the three different model categories: statistical, AIES 
and theoretical. Specifically, they used 89 surveys that had been published during the 
last years and they came to the conclusion that the statistical method is the most 
commonly used, especially the MDA and the logit method. Those methods can 
provide the most accurate results, and the lowest Type 1 and Type 2 errors. (Aziz and 
Dar, 2006) 
Moreover in 2007 there was a new study took place, which was exploring the 
accuracy of the hybrid artificial neural networks. Yim and Mitchell compared them 
with the common artificial neural networks for Australian companies using a time 
frame of two years before their failure. The prediction accuracy of the hybrid 
methods, which were using the same factors as the logit methods, was better for the 
first year prior to the failure but not for the second. (Yim and Mitchell, 2007) 
As we already mentioned except from the statistical and the AIES models there are 
also theoretical methods that they actually determine the causes of bankruptcy (Aziz 
and Dan 2006) i.e. balance sheet decomposition measures, Gambler’ s ruin theory, 
Cash Management theory and several Credit Risk theories. The latter is of high 
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importance for the financial institutions. The three Basel Accords, which have 
implemented though the years, promote minimum requirements and radical changes 
to the banks’ internal assessment policy and in order to avoid credit risk.  
Conclusively, according to the aforementioned studies, the statistical models are the 
most commonly used ones in passed studies (30% uses the MDA and 21% uses the 
logit model) and the most accurate (Aziz and Dar, 2006). They also presented low 
Type I and II error. On the other hand the neural networks techniques are evolving but 
they are still on an early stage. The following research concerning the probability of 
bankruptcy of the European banks will therefore be based on the statistical methods of 
Logistic Regression Analysis and Multiple Discriminant Analysis. A comparison of 
the two methods will be presented after taking under consideration the Type I and 
Type II errors.  
Finally, for additional readings on the subject of corporate bankruptcy, readers may refer 
to E. I. Altman & Edith Hotchkiss (2006), who refer to several problems related to the 
topic, E. I. Altman & Narayanan (1997), who present an international literature review of 
the topic. 
  
 18 
 
3. The Basel Committee 
Financial institutions consist a part of our everyday life. They offer multiple services 
that are necessary to the citizens and to a country’ s growth. They provide common 
services like lending and depositing and more specialized such as underwriting debt 
and equity offerings, facilitating mergers and other corporate reorganizations etc. 
Nevertheless, financial institutions and particularly the commercial banks are 
susceptible to multiple great risks and can massively affect the economy. The most 
significant of those are: 
 Credit risk: The potential that a bank borrower, or counterparty, will fail to 
meet its payment obligations regarding the terms agreed with the bank. 
(BCBS, 2000) 
 Market Risk: The risk of losses in on- or off-balance sheet positions that arise 
from movement in market prices. (BCBS, 2004) 
 Operational Risk: The risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal 
processes, people, and systems or from external events. This definition 
includes legal risk but excludes strategic and reputational risk. (BCBS, 2004) 
 Liquidity: The risk of shortage of cash in order to meet its operations (provide 
loans, return cash to the depositors, repay its loans etc.)  
A bank failure occurs when a bank is unable to meet its obligations to its depositors or 
other creditors because it has become insolvent or too illiquid to meet its liabilities. 
That means that the market value of its assets is less than the market value of its 
liabilities. Thus, when the bank cannot meet its obligations on time it is possible to 
cause a bank panic. The depositors are trying massively to take back their deposits in 
cash and the failure of this act leads to a bank default.   
In order to avoid bank failure, protect the investors and maintain financial stability it 
was a necessity to be submitted to a very strict regulatory system and being monitored 
by supervisory institutions. In the past, the bank supervision and regulation was a 
national responsibility decided by the government, the national central bank and other 
national regulatory authorities and differed significantly. Each country had the ability 
to form its supervisory and regulatory system according to its needs without following 
any standards. The key factor that led to the establishment of international standards 
was the bankruptcy of Herstatt Bank in June 1974 due to foreign exchange settlement 
risk. The international loan market that developed at the time demanded actions that 
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would lead to a global regulatory and supervisory system.  Thus at the end of 1974 in 
Basel of Switzerland the G10 1countries represented by their central bank Governors 
and the monetary authorities of Luxembourg, Switzerland and Spain formed the 
Committee of Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices. The main goal of the 
Committee was to strengthen financial stability worldwide by setting common 
principles that all financial institutions should follow and be supervised for. In 1975, 
the Committee issued the first paper that included the principles of sharing 
supervisory responsibilities for the financial institutions with the national supervisory 
authorities under the name Concordat. In 1983 the Concordat was revised and 
renamed to “Principles for the supervision of banks’ foreign establishments” in order 
to include the principle that the supervisory authorities should examine the banks' 
international business in order to have a safe and sound conclusion.  
Since then, three Accords were published, Basel I, Basel II and Basel III, establishing 
a series of international standards concerning mostly the capital adequacy. During the 
years the members of the Committee increased from the G10 to 45 institutions from 
28 jurisdictions (G20 2  plus Hong Kong and Singapore). The Committee is 
headquartered at the Bank for International Settlements in Basel and meets at least 
four times per year. It is important to note that the decisions are taken by consensus 
among its members and have no legal effect on the banks. Instead, the Committee acts 
as an advisory body that makes recommendations for the healthy operation of the 
banks and can only be enforced through national laws and regulations. The 
implementation of the decisions depends on the members who are committed to 
certain responsibilities: 
 Cooperate in order to achieve the mandate of BCBS. 
 Enhance financial stability. 
 Improve the quality of banking regulation and supervision. 
 Actively contribute to the creation of the BCBS standards and practices. 
                                                 
1  G 10 Countries: Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, UK, USA, Germany and 
Sweden 
2
 G 20 Countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, 
Italy, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, United Kingdom, 
United States and the European Union 
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 Implement the BCBS decisions in their jurisdictions according to the required 
time frame. 
 Participate in BCBS reviews in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
national rules and supervisory standards comparing to the BCBS standards. 
 Promote the interests that can enhance global financial stability and not solely 
national interests during the procedure of decision-making.  
 
3.1. BASEL I: The Basel Capital Accord 
As the international risks were growing the G10 Governors and the Committee 
cooperated in order to find a common replacement of their different national capital 
standards. Thus, in 1987 they reached to the solution of the weighted approach 
measurement of the risk. In July 1988 the Committee introduced the Basel Capital 
Accord, known as BASEL I based on the paper of 1987, to take effect by the end of 
1992. The Accord was mostly referring to the standards concerning the capital 
adequacy and the management of credit risk. Their goal was to secure that the 
financial institutions have enough capital to meet their payment obligations and 
confront unexpected losses.  
The Accord proposed an international norm of measuring the capital to risk-weighted 
assets ratio (CRAR) by setting the minimum percentage to 8% of total capital and 4% 
of Tier 1 capital and 2% of Tier 2 capital. Tier 1 capital is the core capital of a bank 
that includes equity capital and retained earnings, while Tier 2 capital is 
supplementary capital that includes revaluation reserves, hybrid capital instruments 
and subordinated term debt, general loan-loss reserves, and undisclosed reserves. The 
assets were differentiated into 4 different categories according to their risk, named as 
buckets, where bucket 1 consists of the risk free assets (cash, gold and bonds issued 
by OECD governments etc.), bucket 2 consists of low risk assets (claims on private 
sector OECD banks, OECD sub-national governments and GSEs and cash items in 
process of collection), bucket 3 consists of medium risk assets (uninsured mortgage 
loans), bucket 4 consists of the high risk assets (commercial and consumer loans to 
governments that do not belong to OECD) (BIS, 2001). 
 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑑𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
Total Regulatory Capital
Risk Weighted Assets
∗  100 
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Where: 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 1 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 + 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 2 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 
 
𝑅𝑊𝐴 = 0 ∗ 𝐵𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 1 + 0.20 ∗ 𝐵𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 2 + 0.5 ∗ 𝐵𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 3 + 1.0 ∗ 𝐵𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 4 
 
In 1996 the Committee decided to incorporate also other credit risks in the framework 
and issued the Amendment to the Capital Accord to incorporate marker risks (Market 
Risk Amendment). The main purpose was to set capital requirements that can protect 
banks from exposure to systematic risks such as interest rate risk, equity risk, 
currency risk commodity risk etc. The most significant decision of the revised Accord 
was that banks for the first time were allowed to use value-at-risk (VAR)3 models, in 
order to calculate internally their market risk capital requirements according to 
significantly strict qualitative and quantitative norms. 
 
3.2. BASEL II: The New Capital Framework 
Although BASEL I managed to introduce international regulatory standards for the 
financial institutions there were still deficiencies that should be overtaken.  Firstly the 
first Accord was focused on credit risk ignoring other types of risks. Moreover, it 
encountered all bank types as the same and there were no different suggestions for 
investment banks. In addition, the credit rating of the companies was not relevant to 
the category of weighted risk that their loan belongs. For instance, a small company' s 
loan with high leverage was included in bucket 4 (100%), same as a loan of an AAA-
rated corporate company. Therefore, there was a great need for revision of the 
Accord. 
In 2004 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision announced a new capital 
adequacy framework in order to overcome all the shortcomings mentioned above 
known as Basel II Accord which was a revised version of a proposal issued in 1999. 
The main goal was the same: to protect the bank depositors and shareholders by 
accomplishing the international banking system’ s quality and stability. A new goal 
                                                 
3  Value at risk (VaR): A statistical method used to measure and quantify the level of financial 
risk within a firm or investment portfolio over a specific time frame. 
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though that was of great importance to the Committee was to promote more strict risk 
management practices. 
The new norms that the Committee required were based on three pillars (BIS, 2004): 
1. Minimum capital requirements  
2. Supervisory review of the financial institutions’ capital adequacy and internal 
assessment process 
3. Effectiveness of public disclosure concerning the banks’ sound practices 
Below there will be an analysis of the three pillars in order to understand what the 
Committee was trying to achieve. 
 
3.2.1. Pillar I: Minimum Capital Requirements  
One of the most significant improvements in BASEL II was the introduction of 
operational risk. The minimum regulatory capital for operational risk affects the Risk 
Weighted Assets without affecting the minimum requirements of the CAR (8% of the 
total capital, 4% of Tier 1 capital and 2% of Tier 2 capital). 
  
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑑𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
∗  100 
Where 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑊𝐴 = 𝑅𝑊𝐴 + 12.5 ∗ (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 + 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘) 
 
Moreover, three different approaches were proposed to the banks to calculate the 
credit and the operational weighted assets.  
 
1. The Standardised Approach 
 Credit Risk 
The differentiation between BASEL I and BASEL II is that in BASEL II it is 
determined that the risk weights will be defined in accordance with the external credit 
ratings of a corporation by financial services companies such as Standard and Poor' s 
(S&P), Moody' s etc. as the following table describes. 
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Table 1: Risk Weights for Corporate Exposures under the Standardised Approach 
Risk Weights for Corporate Exposures under the Standardised Approach 
Rating AAA to AA- A+ to A- BBB to BB- Below BB- Unrated 
Risk Weight 20% 50% 100% 150% 100% 
 
 Operational Risk 
The bank has to hold minimum regulatory capital in order to avoid default due to 
operational risk. Under the standardized approach the banks' gross income, that is the 
net interest and non-interest income is divided into 8 different business lines: 
Corporate finance, Trading and Sales, Retail Banking, Commercial Banking, Payment 
and Settlement, Agency Services, Asset Management and Retail Brokerage. Those 8 
business lines are characterized by a beta factor that depends on the risk of each line. 
The average of the 8 betas equals with the factor Alpha that is multiplied by the gross 
income in order to estimate the minimum regulatory capital for operational risk. 
 
Table 2: Beta Factor According to the Industry 
Business line  Beta Factor 
Corporate Finance 18% 
Trading and Sales 18% 
Payment and Settlement 18% 
Commercial Banking 15% 
Agency Services 15% 
Retail Banking 12% 
Retail Brokerage 12% 
Asset Management 12% 
 
2. The Internal Ratings-based Approach 
 
 Credit Risk 
This approach gives the bank the freedom to determine internally the way they will 
measure capital requirements for credit risk following four key elements:  
 The probability of default (PD), which is the estimation the probability that the 
borrower will fail to complete his obligations within one year.  
 Loss given default (LGD), which is the loss of the bank after the borrower’ s 
inability to pay his loan. 
 Exposure at default (EAD), which is the nominal value of the borrower’ s total 
debt. 
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 The expected losses (EL) of the bank due to credit risk is calculated by the 
following type: 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 = 𝑃𝐷 ∗ 𝐸𝐴𝐷 ∗ 𝐿𝐺𝐷 
 
 Operational Risk 
Under the Internal Ratings-based approach the total gross income is multiplied with 
the supervisory factor Alpha that equals to 15%. 
 
3. The Advanced Internal Ratings-based Approach 
 Credit Risk 
The only difference between the basic and the advanced internal rating-based 
approach is the use of another key parameter that is the effective maturity of the loan 
(M) and depends on the time frame of the loan' s maturity. In that case, the expected 
losses (EL) of the bank due to credit risk is calculated by the following type: 
 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 = 𝑃𝐷 ∗ 𝐸𝐴𝐷 ∗ 𝐿𝐺𝐷 ∗ 𝑀 
 
 Operational Risk 
The advanced method for minimum regulatory requirements for operational risk 
referred as advanced measurement approaches (AMA) is based on four data elements: 
1. Internal Loss Data (ILD) 
2. External Data (ED) 
3. Scenario Analysis (SBA) 
4. Business Environment and Internal Control Factors (BEICFs) 
This approach allows banks to implement their own mechanisms as long as they use 
capital charges data of one-year time and succeed 99.9% confidence level (BCBS, 
2001). 
 
3.2.2. Pillar II: Supervisory Review 
The supervisory review is the second pillar of great importance. It refers not only to 
the role of the banks that they have to ensure the capital adequacy in order to support 
the risk of their operation but also to the active role that the supervisory authorities 
have to play concerning the promotion and monitoring of effective risk management 
 25 
 
techniques that the banks have to adapt. Through the supervisory review process the 
banks have to ensure that they have developed a strategy that secures their capital 
levels and they have enough capital adequacy to cover the credit, market, and 
operational risk according to the pillar I. On the other hand, the supervisors have to 
give clear incentives to the banks to improve their risk management systems. Thus, in 
order to have a clear and sound opinion, they are able to observe and evaluate the 
implemented strategies, the compliance with the regulatory ratios and their capital 
adequacy and act accordingly if the results are not satisfactory. In addition, they have 
the authority to demand more capital adequacy if they judge that it is necessary in 
order to protect the banks from risks not taken under consideration in pillar I. Last but 
not least the supervisors should act pro-actively, ensure that the capital adequacy of 
the banks is above the minimum standards always and act immediately unless the 
capital is restored.  
 
3.2.3. Pillar III: Market Discipline 
The great innovation that Basel II introduced was the Pillar III that refers to the 
market discipline. The Committee issued a set of disclosure requirements as a way to 
secure market discipline. The banks are obliged to disclose both qualitative and 
quantitative information that describe their business profile, risk exposure, and 
internal risk management systems at least twice a year. Therefore the investors are 
able to use that information and evaluate the capital adequacy and soundness of each 
financial institution. This fact gave a great incentive to the banks, even though they 
raised some confidentiality issues, as they were forced to constantly improve their risk 
management models and systems. 
In 2006 a revised version of BASEL II was published known as International 
Convergence of capital Measurement and Capital Standards that was focused mostly 
on the investment banks. This framework introduced the concept of stressed value at 
risk (SVaR)4 as well as additional charges: Incremental Risk Charge (IRC) to measure 
the migration risk5, comprehensive risk charge to estimate the interactions between 
the different risks as well as securitization and re-securitisation standardized charges 
as in many cases the securities were not classified properly. 
                                                 
4  Stressed Value at risk (SVaR): A statistical method used to measure and quantify the level 
of financial risk within a firm or investment portfolio over a specific time frame under stress. 
5 Migration Risk: The movement of a loan from one bank to another. 
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3.3. BASEL III Accord 
Although BASEL II constituted a revolution of mitigating the most important risks 
that threaten the global economy, there was room for improvement. The banks’ 
discretion that allowed them to use any risk management policy they prefer led to the 
usage of optimistic tools. Thus, even though they covered them concerning the 
minimum required standards they were still not enough. Moreover, the investment 
banks were still exposed to market risk. Last but not least the recommendations of 
BASEL II were very ambiguous. The lack of strictness allowed the regulators 
translate the regulations according to their interests, especially in the US. The banks 
entered the financial crisis with inadequate liquidity buffers and excessive leverage. 
This fact led to the economic crisis of 2007 that became global after the collapse of 
Leeman Brothers in 2008. The Central Bank was forced to support the money marked 
and individual institutions as the banking system was under stress. At the time, the 
Committee issued Principles for sound liquidity risk management and supervision. 
For the first time, liquidity risk was taken into consideration, as there was not a 
framework for minimum liquidity risk standards through the previous Accords. 
In September 2010 the Basel Committee came out with Basel Accord III: 
International framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards and monitoring and 
A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking system, as a 
response to all the unresolved problems arising from the previous one. The third 
Accord reinforced the three pillars of Basel I, proposed new capital and liquidity 
standards and introduced three ratios as norms for liquidity risk, funding risk, and 
leverage deterioration.   
 
3.3.1. Capital Requirements 
At first, the total capital was divided in Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital. Additionally, 
according to Basel II, Tier 1 capital is differentiated to common equity6 (CET1) and 
additional Tier 1 Capital. Under the Basel III, the minimum capital requirements 
became stricter. The schedule was for the total Tier 1 and common equity capital 
minimum requirements to increase from 4% and 2% of the total risk-weighted assets 
                                                 
6 Common equity consists of common shares, retained earnings, common shares issued by subsidiaries 
and held by third parties and accumulated other comprehensive income.  
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to 6% and 4.5% at the beginning of 2013, to 5.5% and 4% at the beginning of 2014 
and finally to 6% and 4.5% accordingly at the beginning of 2015. That means that the 
common equity is of great importance for the confrontation of credit risk, as it is 
required to constitute the 75% of the total Tier 1 capital. Finally, the total capital to 
risk-weighted assets ratio (CRAR) and the Tier 2 minimum percentage remains 8% 
and 2% accordingly.  
 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 1
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 − 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
≥ 4.5% 
And  
𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 1
𝑅𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑘 − 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
≥ 6% 
 
Moreover, the Basel III framework introduces two additional capital buffers in order 
to reinforce the measures taken against credit risk. The first one is the capital 
conversion buffer that is mandatory from 2019 and equivalent to 2.5% of risk-
weighted assets. It is considered as an additional part of CET1 minimum 
requirements. That means that the banks are obliged to hold a total of 7% CET1. The 
buffer is a way of protecting the banks during periods of stress. It has to built up and 
to remain over a certain limit through all the periods otherwise, the banks are 
constrained to minimize the discretionary distribution of earnings until they restore it 
through reducing dividend payments, share-backs, and staff bonus payments or 
through raising new capital.  
The second buffer, known as the discretionary counter-cyclical buffer, is introduced 
to "achieve the broader macro prudential goal of protecting the banking sector and the 
real economy from the system-wide risks stemming from the boom-bust evolution in 
aggregate credit growth and more generally from any other structural variables and 
from the exposure of the banking sector to any other risk factors related to risks to 
financial stability" European Commission (2011). It is also a part of CET1 capital 
with a range between 0.5% and 2.5% of the risk-weighted assets that depends on the 
jurisdictions that the banks are exposed. The national regulators have the right to 
demand 2.5% during times of high credit growth and also impose capital distribution 
constraints if the buffer to not keep up with the minimum requirements. In the case 
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that the buffer reaches the 2.5% of the risk-weighted assets, the banks are obliged to 
hold a total of 9.5% CET1. 
3.3.2. Leverage Ratio 
During the financial crisis, it came to the surface the fact that the banks even though 
they kept the essential capital according to the risk-based ratios set by Basel II, at the 
same time they built up a significant on- and off- balance sheet leverage. As a result, 
the banks were forced to minimize the leverage and this led to reduced credit 
availability and bank capital. In order to avoid similar incidents, the Basel Committee 
introduced another innovative norm, the Leverage Ratio, through the Basel III 
Accord.  
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒
 
 
The main role of the leverage ratio is the reinforcement of the capital requirements 
and the forbiddance of the leverage built up to protect the banking sector and the 
broader financial system from the effects of the de-leveraging process. The leverage 
ratio depends on the banks’ on- and off- balance sheet exposures and not on the risk-
weighted assets. The capital measurement refers to Tier 1 capital and the Exposure 
measurement refers to the on-balance sheet exposures, derivative exposures securities 
financing transaction exposures (SFT) and off- balance sheet (OBS) items. The 
Committee set a testing period from 1 January 2013 to 1 January 2017 to check if the 
minimum requirement 3% is applicable and sufficient. It is significant to be noted that 
the U.S. Federal Reserves took extra measures and set the minimum Leverage Ratio 
at 6% for eight Systemically Important Financial Institution (SIFI) banks, 5% for the 
insured bank holding companies and 6% for deposit-insured subsidiaries. It was also 
mandatory that the proposed recommendations will be publicly disclosed on the 
consolidated basis in order to have credibility since 1 January 2015. 
There are though many critics about the leverage ratio. According to the newspaper 
The Economist (2014) "leverage is a crude and antiquated measure of risk compared 
with the practice of weighting assets by the likelihood of making losses on them, and 
calculating the required cushion of equity accordingly. The chances of losing money 
on a German government bond, the argument runs, are much smaller than they are on 
a car loan, but a simple leverage ratio makes no distinction between the two. As a 
result, leverage ratios might actually encourage banks to buy riskier assets, in the 
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hope of increasing returns to shareholders" In addition Officials at Germany' s central 
bank, for instance, have argued that a binding leverage ratio "punishes low-risk 
business models, and it favors high-risk businesses." (The Economist, 2014). On the 
other hand, Rodriguez (2013) supports that the leverage ratio is just an additional 
norm to the other risk-based requirements and that if banks increase their risk then the 
effects will be immediate to their risk-weight assets and to their capital. After 
resolving the results from the 4-year testing period the Committee will have a clear 
view of the above perspectives and will conclude with the final recommendations 
about leverage ratio. 
 
3.3.3. Liquidity Ratios 
In order to prevent a financial crisis like the one appeared in 2008 and secure a more 
resilient banking sector the Basel committee introduced the two following ratios: 
 
 Liquidity Ratio (LCR) 
The Liquidity Ratio is a short-term protection factor, which assures that banks have 
enough stock of unencumbered high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) that can cover their 
net outflows for a 30-day time period in case of financial stress.  
 
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 (𝐿𝐶𝑅) =
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ − 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡 30 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
 
 
The high-quality liquid assets involve cash, sovereign bonds, central bank reserves 
and some types of equity and corporate bonds. The goal is that the LCR will reach 
minimum 100% on 1 January 2019 by increasing 10% per year. Overall the shrinkage 
of short-term debt and the increase of equity lead to the stability of the banking 
system. There are some concerns though that the LCR might cause adverse 
consequences to the economic growth by reducing lending to the real economy 
(Bonner, 2012). The advantages though are clearly more than the costs. 
 
 Net Stable Funding Ratio (NFSR) 
The Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) was introduced in Basel III Accord in order to 
prevent a bank default caused by lack of long-term liquidity. Due to possible 
disruptions of the funding sources, the banks are obliged to hold a sound funding 
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policy by always succeeding more available amount of stable funding than the 
required stable funding. 
 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 (𝑁𝐹𝑆𝑅) =
𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 (𝐴𝑆𝐹)
𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 (𝑅𝑆𝐹)
≥ 100% 
 
The Available amount of Stable Funding is the amount of capital and liabilities that 
the bank considers as reliable and extends to one-year horizon. At first the amount of 
capital and liabilities is divided into five different categories and subsequently, each 
category is multiplied by an ASF factor according to the category. The sum of those 
categories is the ASF. 
 
Table 3: ASF Factor According to the Loan Category 
Category ASF Factor 
Loans longer than 1 year 100% 
Loans to retail customers with maturity less than 1 year 95% 
Loans to corporate customers with maturity less than 1 year 90% 
Government and corporate bonds 50% 
Off-balance sheet categories 0% 
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4. Analysis of the European Banking Framework 
It is a fact that the integration of bank regulation has long been the desire of EU 
policy-makers. The European Banking Framework would complement the internal 
market for capital and the single currency throughout the 90s decade. However, 
powerful political insuperable obstacles such as the financial repression and economic 
nationalism, which were applied by member states, led to the failure of the creation of 
the European Banking Framework. This became obvious during the negotiation of the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1991 and of the Treaty of Nice in 2000.  
During the 2000s decade, cross-border mergers and acquisitions, such as Abbey 
National by Santander Group, led to the need for a common European Banking Policy 
not least by the International Monetary Fund, via the creation of the Committee of 
European Banking Supervisors in 2004. (Cihak, Martin) In 2009 a group of high-level 
experts, the de Larosiere Group published a report that recommended the composition 
of the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) to work in a common 
European framework. Later, in 2010 they introduced both a micro-prudential and a 
macro-prudential supervision and regulation controlled by European and national 
supervisors.  The micro-prudential policy led to the creation of the European Systemic 
Risk Board (ESRB), while the macro-prudential to creation of the European Banking 
Authority (EBA), the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and the 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), which constitute 
the Joint Committee of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs). 
Nevertheless, the financial instability of large member-states from the middle of 2011 
due to the fragility of numerous EU banks, the arising of private debts due to property 
bubble, which were transferred to sovereign debt through banking system bail outs, 
changed radically the way of thinking about banking policy. This was later depicted 
on June 2012, in the report written by European Council President Herman Van 
Rompuy, which proposed radical changes and integration in three frameworks that are 
financial, budgetary, and economic by ensuring the necessary democratic legitimacy 
and accountability. (Herman Van Rompuy, 2012)  
It is significant to mention in this point that the important milestone was the summit 
of the leading member states on 28-29 June 2012, which led to the creation of Single 
Supervisory Mechanism and followed the announcement of the establishment of the 
Single Resolution Mechanism in December 2012 by the European Commission. 
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("Euro Area Summit Statement", 2012) Europe’ s banking union plays a significant 
role in addressing the Eurozone crisis and the European Supervisory Authorities, The 
Single Rulebook and its two pillars, SSM and SRM, are the backbones of the 
European Banking Union. 
4.1. European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) 
On 1 January 2011, 3 European Supervisory Authorities were established to ensure 
the proper implementation of the regulation, the coordination between national 
supervisors and the effective management of risks and issues with cross-border 
effects. 
 The European Banking Authority (EBA) is an independent EU Authority, 
which ensures effective and consistent prudential regulation and supervision 
across the European banking sector, including the supervision of the 
recapitalisation of banks. 
 The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) an independent EU 
Authority which enhances the protection of investors by supervising capital 
markets, credit rating agencies and trade repositories. 
 The European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), an 
independent advisory body which deals with insurance supervision.  
The above three supervising authorities represent all 28 national supervisors. Their 
role is to contribute to the writing of a single rulebook for financial regulation in 
Europe, solve cross-border issues, prevent risks and help restore financial stability. 
4.2. Single Rulebook 
The Single Rulebook is a name for the EU laws, which covers the European Union’s 
financial sector. It consists of 3 main legislative acts: 
 
The Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV)  
The pre-mentioned Directive implements the Basel III capital requirements for banks. 
It is a fact that CRD IV sets stronger prudential requirements for banks requiring them 
to keep sufficient level of capital both in quantity and in quality. 
 
Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive (DGSD) 
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The Directive ensures that bank deposits in all EU Member States are guaranteed up 
to €100.000 per depositor per bank in case of a bank’s inability to pay its debts. The 
new Directive also aims to oblige Banks to inform their client about Deposit 
Guarantee Scheme protection of their Deposits.   
 
Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) 
BRRD implements a recovery and resolution framework of credit institutions and 
investment firms in danger of failing. This Directive was established due to the deep 
unfairness and the increased public debt. The latter were caused by the repeated 
bailout of banks. As a consequence, a heavy burden was imposed on taxpayers. 
4.3. The Pillars Of The Banking Union 
The composition of single centralized mechanisms for the supervision and 
restructuring of banks has been created for the financial stability and growth in the 
euro area. The banking union uses 2 pillars: 
 
-The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) 
-The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) 
 
4.3.1. Pillar I 
The first and main pillar of the banking union is the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
(SSM). It was enacted through Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 
2013, which confers on the European Central Bank the prudential supervision of 
credit institutions and Regulation (EU) No 1022/2013 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 22 October 2013 amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 which is 
directly related to the European Banking Authority. Since November 2014, SSM 
mechanism is fully operational.  
The main characteristics of the Single Supervisory Mechanism are the following: 
“The SSM consists of the ECB and the national competent authorities of participating 
Member States. Its overriding objectives are to ensure safety and soundness of the 
European Banking System and to ensure the unity and integrity of the EU internal 
market. All Euro Area Member States are automatically members, while non-euro 
area members can decide to participate in the SSM through a procedure involving the 
national competent authority entering into a “close co-operation” with the ECB.” 
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(KERN) The close co-operation agreement can be terminated by the ECB or by the 
participating non-Eurozone member-state.  
Additionally, participating non-Eurozone states will also have a place on the ECB’S 
Supervisory Board. The ECB Governing Council, a mediation panel, with the right to 
object to the Supervisory Decisions from the Board, supports this Board. 
Furthermore, the most significant institution, including those with holdings over 30 
billion euros or 20% of the GDP of the member-state and those funded or having 
submitted a funding application, will be directly supervised by the European Central 
Bank. If a bank is in danger of defaulting, the responsibility for resolving, rest with 
the SSM. 
In addition, SSM confers new supervision powers on the ECB regarding the banks of 
the euro area. Also, the ECB may at any moment supervise directly one or more, less 
significant banks in order to achieve consistent application of high supervisory 
standards.  
 
4.3.2. Pillar II 
The second pillar is the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). This mechanism has 
entered into force on 1 January 2015 whereas bailing in and resolution functions were 
applied from 1 January 2016. The European Commission also proposed it in July 
2013, so as to complement the Single Supervisory Mechanism. Specifically, SRM 
would apply to all banks, which are under the control of SSM. 
Moreover, if a bank is in danger of defaulting, the duty for resolving it rests with the 
Single Resolution Mechanism. The intervention of SRM would be much more 
efficient in case of cross-border failures which entail the risk of contagion than a 
network of national resolution authorities. Additionally, banks that are being 
restructured will have a medium-term funding support so as to continue to operate 
thanks to the Single Resolution Fund to which all banks in the participating Member 
State would contribute with 1% of their covered deposits.   
SRM would basically apply the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive via the 
Single Resolution Board. The decisions of the Board will be coherent and centralized 
while the common resolution financing arrangements will be mainly based on a 
Single Resolution Fund. Members of the board are the Commission, the Council, the 
ECB and the national resolution authorities. SRM would also be responsible for the 
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liquidation of non-viable banks while will supervise directly the resolution of 
significant banks under the guidance of ECB.  National authorities would be directly 
responsible for smaller banks.  
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5. Methodology  
5.1.  Sample data 
The sample data for the study were collected from Bankscope database and cover 216 
European Banks bankrupt and non-bankrupt. We matched each Bankrupt Bank with a 
healthy one, according to size (Total Assets 3 years prior to bankruptcy). 
Additionally, search strategy criteria comprised of Eastern and Western Europe as a 
geographical criterion, and a 10-year period of account availability from 2006-2016. 
The choice of this time period is not irrelevant. The same time period, i.e.10 years, is 
applied to the empirical study “Predicting Corporate Failure: Empirical Evidence for 
the UK” by Charitou Andreas, Neophytou Evi, Charalambous Chris (2004).  Altman 
also states that in order to predict a bankruptcy you need a sample of at least 6 years, 
which consists two years prior to bankruptcy.   
“Failed banks" sample group is comprised of banks having Status: Bankruptcy, In 
liquidation, Dissolved, Dissolved (merger), Dissolved (demerger), whereas the “non-
failed” banks category consists by   "the Living Banks" sub-category. Namely "Living   
Banks", have their status set as active, and for which there is a financial statement in 
the past three years.   
Additionally, sample data of 108 matched pairs, of failed and living banks, are split 
into two categories: the training group to get model coefficients, and the testing group 
to get prediction accuracy.  
Specifically, the training group counts in 2/3 of the matched pairs of banks according 
to the “total assets” size during the period 2006-2016. And the validation group 
embodies the rest 1/3 of the matched pairs of banks according to the total assets size, 
during the period. Furthermore, the main data used are annual and were derived from 
the corresponding reporting financial statements. 
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The following chart presents the banks’ class specialization. The majority are 
commercial banks with a 42,66 percentage. Finance companies, savings banks, and 
co-operative banks are also included in the sample. 
 
Figure 1: Banks' Class Specification 
Breakdown by Specialisation (100% = 216) 
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The location of the European Failed Banks regarding the period 2006-2016 is 
depicted in the following Chart. 
 
Figure 2: Location of the European Failed Banks 
Breakdown by Europe region (100% = 108) 
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5.2. Variables (Dependent and Independent) 
In the analysis of bankruptcy prediction, as far as the dependent variable is 
concerned, we are using a binary choice model, where the dependent variable takes 
values 0 and 1. Specifically, the dependent variable equals to 1 if the firm is bankrupt 
and 0 if a bank is healthy.  
The independent variables we have used are financial ratios, which were downloaded 
from Bankscope Database website and cover the period from 2006 until 2016. Also, 
financial ratios were derived from financial statements such as balance sheets and 
income statements. This gave us the opportunity to get data for up 5 years prior to 
bankruptcy. As a consequence, the probability of bankruptcy can be tested for at least 
3 years prior. Then we conducted Univariate Stepwise Regression Analysis in order to 
select the financial ratios with the strongest predictive ability as independent variables 
for our research.   
 
5.2.1. Camel Rating System  
The evaluation of the financial performance of European Banking Institution is 
critical because they play a vital role in growth and economic development of 
Western and Eastern Europe. Therefore it is important to distinguish which areas/ 
indicators of a bank’s operations should be examined.  
The financial ratios are presented according to the Camel Rating System. It is a fact 
that there are many indicators relevant to the financial performance of banks. 
Nonetheless, the focus is on five bank performance indicators, namely Capital 
Adequacy, Asset Quality, Management Capability, Earnings and Liquidity, which 
constitute the Camel Rating System, as “CAMEL is a recognized international rating 
system that bank supervisory authorities use in order to rate financial institutions.” 
(Investopedia). The existence of these kinds of models reflects the importance of a 
bank’s financial performance for shareholders, depositors, and other creditors. 
 
 Capital Adequacy:   
This indicator refers to the capital that a bank must have so as to cover its risky assets. 
To get a high capital adequacy rating banks must abide by regulations, interest 
dividend rules and practices based on the performance measures suggested by Basel 
Committee. (Basel Committee, 2015). The adequacy of capital is assessed via two 
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important ratios such as Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) and the ratio of capital to 
assets. (Uyen Dang 2011). Additionally, the financial ratios of Total Debt to Total 
Assets and Equity to Total Assets have also been stated as good predictors of failure. 
(Charitou Andreas, Neophytou Evi, Charalambous Chris, 2004)  
 Asset Quality 
Asset quality is an important indicator of the strength of the bank because it refers to 
the quality of the loans, that is, high or low probability of repayment. Poor asset 
quality leads to bank failure in most of the cases. Asset quality reflects the health of a 
bank against loss in its assets because asset reduction places creditworthiness of a 
financial institution at risk. Moreover, asset impairment of a bank has a spillover 
effect as losses are eventually erased against capital. (Ghasempour, Salami 2016). 
Furthermore, asset quality is depicted on the efficiency of a bank’s investment 
policies and practices (Investopedia). In order for Asset Quality to be examined, Net 
Interest Margin Ratio and Loan Loss Provisions/ Total Loans are selected. The Net 
Interest Margin Ratio indicates how successful is a bank when investing its funds, 
compared to the expenses on the same investments (Investopedia). 
 Management Capability 
"Management Capability is basically the capability of the board of directors and 
management, to identify, measure, and control the risks of an institution‘s activities 
and to ensure the safe, sound, and efficient operation in compliance with applicable 
laws and regulations” (Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System 1997, p.6). For 
this reason Cost/Income ratio will be examined. 
 Earnings  
The institution' s ability to create profit in order to expand, be competitive and 
increase or replenish capital. While evaluating and rating earnings, examiners take 
into account the long-run earnings ability of a bank (Wikipedia). Two of the most 
significant profitability ratios are Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Assets 
(ROA).  
 Liquidity: 
Liquidity determines the ability of the bank to pay its current obligations on time and 
is examined through the Asset/Liability Management (ALM). Asset/Liability 
management is the process of managing assets and cash flows so as to pay company’s 
liabilities on time.  
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Ratios, such as Liquidity Coverage Ratio and the supplementary Net Stable Funding 
Ratio, have been developed by promoting the short-term resilience of the liquidity 
risk profile of the banks of the European Union (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision 2015):. Since this study refers to a wide variety of banks apart from the 
European Union borders and because there is a lack of data in Bankscope website, 
Total Assets to Total Deposits and Net Loans to Total Deposits and Borrowings. 
 
Finally, this study will examine the five CAMEL variables via ten (10) financial ratios 
presented in the following table.  
 
Table 4: List of CAMEL Financial Ratios 
CAMEL INDICATOR RATIO SYMBOL 
Capital Adequacy Equity/Total Assets 
Total Debt /Total Assets 
Capital Adequacy Ratio 
EQTA 
TDTA 
CAR 
Asset quality Net Interest Margin 
Loan Loss Provisions/Total Loans 
NIM 
LLPTL 
Management Capability  Cost/Income COIN 
Earnings Return on Average Equity 
Return on Average Assets 
ROAE 
ROAA 
Liquidity Total Loans/Total Deposits 
Net Loans/Total Deposits and 
Borrowings 
LATA 
NLTDB 
 
 
5.2.2.  Logistic Regression Analysis 
Logistic regression enables someone to use regression models in order to “predict the 
probability of a particular categorical response for a given set of independent 
variables” (Berenson 2013, p601).  
The logistic regression equation is the following: 
Y= b0+b1X1i+b2X2i+…+bkXki 
Where  
X are independent variables, that is financial ratios of bank j at the end of year t. 
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bk is constant and b1, b2,…bn are slope coefficients. 
In this study and as stated before, the dependent variable Y is any bank belonging to 
the sample of 216 banks.  Y equals to 1 if a bank is bankrupt and 0 if a bank is 
healthy. 
Furthermore, the independent variables are the ten (10) financial ratios based on the 
CAMEL rating system.  Afterwards, the use of the statistical software package 
MINITAB and the implementation of Logistic Regression lead to model coefficients 
from the Training Sample i.e. b1, b2…bk. 
Data are analyzed for one year prior to failure, two years prior to failure and three 
years prior to failure, respectively. 
Next, the probability of default needs to be calculated (Pr) 
Pr= 1/1+e-y* 
Y*= a+b1X1+b2X2+…+bn+Xn. 
The above Model needs to be applied to the validation or forecasting sample, which 
is about 1/3 using the latest years. 
Predictions are correct: 
 -If Pr>0,5 and banks in your testing sample are defined as Bankrupt.   
- If Pr<0,5 and banks in your testing sample is defined as healthy 
Additionally, it is very important to find incorrect predictions (TYPE I, II ERRORS) 
If Pr<0.5 and the bank is defined as bankrupt, then prediction is incorrect (TYPE I 
ERROR) 
If Pr >0,5 and the bank is defined as healthy, and then prediction is incorrect. (TYPE 
II ERROR) 
TYPE I errors are more costly to banks since if the bank is predicted healthy and then 
defaults, the economic damage is high 
 
5.2.3. Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA) 
A statistical technique used to reduce the differences between variables in order to 
classify them into a set number of broad groups. (Investopedia) Multiple discriminant 
analysis (MDA) tries, as the name suggests discriminating between different groups. 
In this study, MDA discriminates between the group of failed banks and Healthy 
banks. MDA is conducted for a 3 year time period, beginning one year prior to failure 
and two years prior to failure and three years prior to failure respectively. 
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MDA Model will have the following form: 
Y= a+b1X1jt+b2X2+…+bn+Xnjt. 
Similar to the logistic regression analysis, the formula is tested into the data of the 
validation group in order for the dependent variable Y to be computed.  
Consequently the cut-off point is calculated and is equal to  
 
{(Average of failed banks)*(Number of failed banks)}+{(Average of healthy banks)*(Number of healthy banks)} 
Total Observations 
 
Above this point, a bank is categorized as failed, whereas a bank below this point is 
categorized as healthy.  
Finally, the computation of TYPE 1 and TYPE II errors completes the Multiple 
Discriminant Analysis Method where: 
TYPE 1 error while Y>(cut-off point) defines a bank as healthy 
TYPE II error while Y<(cut-off point) defines a bank as failed  
Similar to Logistic Regression Analysis, TYPE I error is more costly for a bank. 
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6. Data Analysis & Discussion  
In this chapter, data are being analyzed with the following methods:  
a) Descriptive Statistics 
b) Univariate Stepwise Regression Analysis 
c) Multivariate Logistic Regression Analysis 
d) Multiple Discriminant Analysis 
e) Comparative results of Multivariate Logistic Regression Analysis and 
Multiple Discriminant Analysis 
6.1.  Descriptive Statistics  
Descriptive Statistics is a term that “refers to methods that primarily help summarize 
and present data”. (Berenson, Levine, Szabat 2015 p 32) In this study, Descriptive 
Statistics will be used in order to quantitatively describe and summarize features of 
failed and living bank groups. Additionally, Descriptive Statistics that is Median, 
Standard Deviation, and Average were calculated by using statistical package.   
The following tables exhibit the Descriptive Statistics of failed and living banks 1 
year, 2 years and 3 years prior to failure respectively. 
 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics of Living Banks 
 
 
 
 
 
1 year prior to failure 
 EQTA CAR TDTA LLPTL NIM COIN ROAE ROAA LATA 
Median 10,70% 18,20% 58,71% 3,54% 1,83% 73,44% 3,38% 0,33% 9,54% 
Std.Dev. 25,14% 45,89% 22,85% 11,87% 2,98% 37,42% 15,22% 4,87% 23,85% 
Average 21,21% 33,89% 56,30% 7,24% 2,58% 76,07% 0,22% -0,11% 17,33% 
2 years prior to failure  
 EQTA CAR TDTA LLPTL NIM COIN ROAE ROAA LATA 
Median 10,53% 17,24% 59,08% 3,91% 2,01% 69,37% 3,62% 0,31% 8,32% 
Std.Dev. 23,91% 78,80% 24,43% 15,11% 2,63% 30,61% 51,15% 2,84% 27,50% 
Average 20,21% 36,70% 55,38% 7,90% 2,76% 75,03% -1,85% 0,43% 18,54% 
3 years prior to failure 
 EQTA CAR TDTA LLPTL NIM COIN ROAE ROAA LATA 
Median 10,31% 17,29% 59,65% 3,68% 2,05% 71,75% 3,42% 0,30% 7,22% 
Std.Dev. 23,40% 28,96% 23,38% 12,36% 2,85% 27,79% 12,23% 12,00% 23,16% 
Average 19,24% 25,92% 55,76% 7,22% 2,86% 70,79% 2,45% -1,40% 15,10% 
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics of Failed Banks 
 
By the two tables, one can conclude that there are differences between the descriptive 
statistics of failed and living banks, which are the following: 
LLPTL: The Loan Loss Provisions to Total Loans ratio deteriorates significantly 
regarding the failed banks category, which means that risk is not properly 
remunerated by margins.   
ROAE: The higher the ratio the better, taking into consideration that this ratio is a 
measure of the return on shareholder funds. This justifies the significant difference 
between failed and living banks (Median: Failed 0,22%, Living 3,38%) 
LATA: This liquidity ratio is significantly high in the failed banks category, 
especially the year prior to failure. (Median 21% for failed banks). It indicates what 
percentages of bank’s assets are tied up in loans.  
6.2. Univariate Analysis 
In this section, the predictive ability of the financial ratios will be examined, by 
implementing Univariate stepwise regression analysis. The sample ratios were derived 
from the last year prior to failure for the failed banks and the corresponding financial 
ratios for the healthy banks, respectively.  The following table exhibits, the coefficient 
of each ratio alongside its corresponding p-value and its corresponding Association 
percentage. (Charitou, Neophytou, Charalambous 2004)  
 
 
1 year prior to failure 
 EQTA CAR TDTA LLPTL NIM COIN ROAE ROAA LATA 
Median 9,15% 15,50% 63,45% 0,98% 1,75% 66,69% 0,22% 0,03% 21% 
Std.Dev. 21,37% 4,49% 15,94% 2,50% 0,84% 51,43% 10,22% 1,02% 11,40% 
Average 4,81% 17,10% 60,90% 2,32% 1,67% 74,29% -3,67% -0,40% 19,49% 
2 years prior to failure 
 EQTA CAR TDTA LLPTL NIM COIN ROAE ROAA LATA 
Median 9,20% 15,25% 60,47% 1,86% 2,15% 63,20% 0,63% 0,02% 15,64% 
Std.Dev. 42,46% 5,25% 23,13% 23,04% 11,20% 54,20% 152,26% 20,02% 14,51% 
Average 3,03% 16,16% 57,02% 6,14% 2,22% 73,13% 9,48% -7,41% 17,07% 
3 years prior to failure 
 EQTA CAR TDTA LLPTL NIM COIN ROAE ROAA LATA 
Median 10,58% 14,97% 62,24% 1,56% 2,20% 73,87% 0,68% 0,09% 13,27% 
Std.Dev. 11,81% 5,56% 20,61% 1,62% 3,97% 63,99% 39,91% 6,03% 12,47% 
Average 13,90% 16,09% 59,82% 1,90% 3,33% 81,49% -8,90% -1,15% 15,53% 
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Table 7: Univariate Stepwise Regression Analysis Results 
Bank Performance Indicator  Ratio Coefficient P-Value Association  
Capital Adequacy EQTA 
CAR 
TDTA 
-0,01842 
-0,626 
0,00205 
0,0006 
0,0035 
0,0736 
57,70% 
64,30% 
57,70% 
Asset Quality LLPTL 
NIM 
-0,012206 
-0,0113 
0,0106 
0,0607 
51% 
42,70% 
Management Capability COIN 0,00708 0,0061 52,60% 
Earnings ROAE 
ROAA 
0,00182 
-0,0278 
0,0231 
0,0061 
46% 
48,50% 
Liquidity LATA 
NLTDB 
0,00186 
0,00530 
0,0759 
0,0387 
49,30% 
52% 
 
The predictive ability of the independent variables i.e. financial ratios is depended 
upon the p-value or else observed the level of significance and the association 
percentage. P-values range from 0 to 1 and the chosen level of significance which was 
selected is a=0,05. For this reason, the most appropriate ratios to be used in the 
Multivariate Logistic Regression Analysis and in Multiple Discriminant Analysis are 
those with p-value<0,05. 
 
Table 8: List of Independent Financial Ratios used in Logistic Regression Analysis and in OLS Regression 
Analysis 
 
Furthermore, the Association percentage measures the association between the 
observed responses and the predicted probabilities are more or less the same for all 
the selected independent variables. Capital Adequacy Ratio has the highest 
percentage, i.e.64,30% while the lowest percentage namely 42% belongs to Net 
Interest Margin ratio, which has also a p-value>0,05 and for this reason is excluded 
from Logit and MDA analysis. 
To conclude, Table 8 refers to the six financial ratios, which are selected as 
independent variables for further analysis.  
Bank Performance Indicator Financial Ratio Name Financial Ratio Definition 
Capital Adequacy EQTA Equity/ Total Assets 
Asset quality LLPTL Loan Loss Provisions/ Total Loans 
Management capability COIN Cost/Income 
Earnings ROAE 
ROAA 
Return on Equity 
Return on Assets 
Liquidity  NLTDB Net Loans/ Total Deposits & Borrowing 
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Finally, it should also be stressed as a limitation that there are also other similar 
statistical methodologies such as Correlation Analysis and/ or Univariate Logit 
Analysis. Nonetheless, Univariate Stepwise Regression Analysis is considered to be 
as accurate as the pre-mentioned statistical methodologies. 
 
6.3.  Multivariate Logistic Regression Analysis 
Multivariate Logistic Regression Analysis is an alternative approach, which enables 
the user to predict the probability of a categorical response for a given total of 
independent variables. (Berenson, Levine, Szabat 2013) 
In order for this study to have a complete and sound outcome, we separate the sample 
into two groups, the training sample using the earliest years and the validation or 
forecasting sample, using the latest years.   
The results of this statistical method are represented in Table 9 and it is based on the 
six independent variables referred in Section 4.2.   
 
Table 9: Logistic Regression Analysis on the Training Sample of Failed and Lining Banks until 3 Years 
Prior to Bankruptcy 
Results on the first line represent slope coefficients. P-values are in parenthesis 
Bank Performance 
Indicator 
Independent Variables  Yr-1 Model Yr-2 Model Yr-3 Model 
 Constant 0,32529 0,51575 0,99714 
Capital Adequacy Equity/ Total Assets -0,018549 
(0,7099) 
-0,033252 
(0,9705) 
0,105557 
(0,0890) 
Asset Quality Loan Loss Provisions/ Total 
Loans 
-0,013305 
(0,1105) 
-0,01207 
(0,6743) 
0,0065 
(0,098) 
Management 
Capability 
Cost/Income -0,002155 
(0,7457) 
0,0057 
(0,6857) 
0,0029 
(0,0657) 
 
Earnings 
Return on Equity -0,0011 
(0,7955) 
-0,0006 
(0,6955) 
0,0207 
(0,0505) 
Return on Assets -0,02789 
(0,5890) 
-0,0157 
(0,3584) 
-0,3554 
(0,0024) 
Liquidity Net Loans/ Total Deposits & 
Borrowings  
0,00530 
(0,0850) 
0,0987 
(0,1736) 
0,0032 
(0,3885) 
 
Consequently in order to find the probability of default, the following equation is 
calculated: 
Y = 0,3252 - 0,018549EQTA - 0,013305LLPTL - 0,001COIN - 0,0011ROE - 
0,02789ROA + 0,0530NLTDB 
Similar procedure is followed regarding the validation sample. 
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As far as the percentage of the correct prediction and Type I and II errors are 
concerned, Table 10 represents the percentage of correctly predicted failed and 
healthy banks with their misclassification errors of Logistic Regression Analysis.   
 
Table 10: Results of Logistic Regression Analysis 
Training Group Yr-1 Results Yr-2 Results Yr-3 Results 
Correctly predicted 84,75% 70,97% 58,50% 
Type I Error 5,75% 10,80% 20,04% 
Type II Error 9,50% 18,23% 21.46% 
 
Validation Group Yr-1 Results Yr-2 Results Yr-3 Results 
Correctly predicted 78,26% 71,73% 59,65% 
Type I Error 10,05% 10,07% 17,65% 
Type II Error 11,69% 18,20% 22,70% 
 
Total Group Yr-1 Results Yr-2 Results Yr-3 Results 
Correctly predicted 81,75% 70,88% 55,75% 
Type I Error 7,54% 9,95% 16,75% 
Type II Error 10,71% 19,17% 27,50% 
 
From the above results, one can observe that the predictions are more accurate, when 
the bank’s prediction of failure is examined one year prior to failure. The correct 
classification of the total group is 81,75% one year prior to failure, 70,88% two years 
prior to failure and 55,75% three years prior to failure.  
Furthermore, in all the categories, we can observe that the Type I Error is significantly 
lower from the Type II Error. This indicates that the predictive ability of the model is 
in an adequate level because the misclassification of a failed bank as healthy is not as 
costly as the misclassification of a healthy bank as failed.   
 
6.4.  Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA) 
MDA is a statistical technique used to evaluate financial decisions that propose a set 
of alternatives, such as in our case different financial ratios in order to predict the 
probability of a bank to default or to remain among the group of healthy ones.  
The results of the MDA Analysis are represented in Table 11 including a 3-year time 
period, prior to failure,  
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Table 11: Multiple Discriminant Analysis on the Training Sample of Failed and Living Banks 
Results on the first line represent slope coefficients. P-values are in parenthesis 
Bank Performance 
Indicator 
Independent Variables  Yr-1 Model Yr-2 Model Yr-3 Model 
 Constant 
 
0,29549 0,47585 0,56788 
Capital Adequacy Equity/Total Assets -0,00927 
(0,6123) 
-0,040512 
(0,5155) 
0,087205 
(0,1064) 
Asset Quality Loan Loss Provisions/ Total 
Loans 
-0,0095 
(0,0576) 
-0,01050 
(0,3539) 
 0,0004 
(0,6569) 
Management 
Capability 
Cost/Income -0,003456 
(0,7106) 
0,00754 
(0,6089) 
0,002954 
(0,0897) 
 
Earnings 
Return on Equity -0,00156 
(0,8587) 
-0,0009 
(0,5589) 
0,04567 
(0,0865) 
Return on Assets -0,04587 
(0,4955) 
-0,02545 
(0,3054) 
-0,4887 
(0,0054) 
Liquidity Net Loans/ Total Deposits 
& Borrowings 
0,00589 
(0,0970) 
0,10564 
(0,2315) 
0,00978 
(0,4466) 
 
 
As a consequence, the resultant regression function is formulated as follows: 
Y= 0, 29549- 0,00927EQTA- 0,095LLTL-0, 03456COIN-0,00156ROE – 0,04587 
ROA+ 0,00589NLTD 
Similar to the case of Logistic Regression Analysis, Table 12 shows the results of the 
correctly predicted healthy and failed banks, alongside with the misclassification 
errors of Multiple Discriminant Analysis.  
 
Table 12: Results of Multiple Discriminant Analysis 
Training Group Yr-1 Results Yr-2 Results Yr-3 Results 
Correctly predicted 79,85% 77,85% 57,30% 
Type I Error 8,24% 10,52% 13,30% 
Type II Error 11,91% 9,17% 29,40% 
 
Validation Group Yr-1 Results Yr-2 Results Yr-3 Results 
Correctly predicted 79,75% 69,18% 54,65% 
Type I Error 11,08% 12,65% 11,65% 
Type II Error 9,17% 18,17% 33,70% 
 
Total Group Yr-1 Results Yr-2 Results Yr-3 Results 
Correctly predicted 79,55% 72,44% 67,06% 
Type I Error 6,54% 11,85% 13,06% 
Type II Error 13,91% 15,71% 19,88% 
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The results verify the declination of the percentage of correct classification from 
Year-1 to Year-3. The medium size of the sample, namely 216 banks justifies the 
differences of the percentages between Type I and Type II errors from Year-1 to 
Year-3.    
 
6.5. Comparative Failure Prediction results of multivariate Logistic 
Regression Analysis and Multiple Discriminant Analysis. 
In this section, the results of Logistic Regression Analysis and Multiple Discriminant 
Analysis are going to be compared so as to conclude with the analysis that has a more 
accurate predictive ability. The relevant comparative results are depicted in Table 13. 
 
Table 13: Comparative Prediction Results 
 Year 
prior to 
failure 
Logit 
Training 
Group 
MDA 
Training 
Group 
Logit 
Validation 
Group 
MDA 
Validation 
Group 
Logit 
Total 
Group 
MDA 
Total 
Group 
Correctly 
Predicted 
      1st 
2nd 
3rd 
 
84,75% 
70,97% 
58,50% 
79,85% 
77,85% 
57,30% 
78,26% 
71,73% 
59,65% 
79,75% 
69,18% 
54,65% 
81,75% 
70,88% 
55,75% 
79,55% 
72,44% 
67,06% 
Type I 
Error 
      1st 
2nd 
3rd 
 
5,75% 
10,80% 
20,04% 
8,24% 
10,52% 
13,30% 
10,05% 
10,07% 
17,65% 
11,08% 
12,65% 
11,65% 
7,54% 
9,95% 
16,75% 
6,54% 
11,85% 
13,06% 
Type II 
Error 
      1st 
2nd 
3rd 
 
9,50% 
18,23% 
21,46% 
11,91% 
9,17% 
29,40% 
11,69% 
18,20% 
22,70% 
9,17% 
18,17% 
33,70% 
10,71% 
19,17% 
27,50% 
13,91% 
15,71% 
19,88% 
 
As a conclusion, the logit Model predicts bank failure with 81,75% accuracy in 
comparison with the 79,55% for the MDA Model, one year prior to bankruptcy. 
Nonetheless, MDA Model outperforms the Logit Model showing 72,44% accuracy 
two years prior to failure and 67,06% accuracy three years prior to failure. 
Additionally, in the last column of Table 13, it is obvious that the MDA Analysis 
performs better for three years prior to failure period.    
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7. Conclusions and Recommendations  
The focus of this study, was primarily the Analysis of the European Banking 
Framework, the presentation of the European Banking Framework, the European 
Banking Regulation System and specifically, Basel I, Basel II and Basel III and 
secondly development and testing of failure prediction models and specifically, 
Logistic Regression Analysis and Multiple Discriminant Analysis for Banks in East 
and West Europe. 
The empirical data for the study were collected from Bankscope electronic database 
and cover 108 matched pairs of failed and healthy European banks according to the 
size of total assets. The sample consisted also of bankrupt and healthy banks. All the 
data collected were during the years 2006-2016.  
Additionally, the financial ratios used were based on Camel Rating System. The 
sample was separated into two groups, training, and validation. Training group 
consisted of 2/3 of the sample data and concerns the earliest years and the validation 
group consisted of 1/3 of the sample data and has to do with the latest years.  
Regarding the Comparative Prediction results of multivariate Logistic Regression 
Analysis and Multiple Discriminant Analysis, it was pointed out that MDA model 
performs slightly better in comparison with the Logistic Regression Model in all three 
categories, namely Correct Prediction, Type I Error and Type II Error for the three 
years prior to failure time period.  
Furthermore, future studies may examine further geographical legal culture and 
economic policy differences between failed and non-failed banks, and the effect of the 
size of a bank concerning its failure.  
Additionally, the choice of the financial ratios as independent variables with the best 
probability to evaluate bank default is not based on a sound theoretical framework and 
also the lack of data for specific observations.   
However, despite the limitations cited above, the aforementioned failure prediction 
models namely Logistic Regression Analysis and MDA Analysis can be used 
complementary to Basel II Accord, taking into consideration that the full 
implementation of the Accord has been extended until 31 of March 2019. The 
distinction between weak and strong banks can provide information of significant 
value to depositors, rating agencies, creditors, depositors and investment firms.  
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9. Index 
Table 14: List of failed and Living European Banks over the period 2006-2017 matched according to the size 
of total assets 
FAILED BANKS LIVING BANKS 
  Bank Name 
Total Assets 
th EUR 
Year - 3 Bank Name 
Total Assets 
th EUR 
Last avail. yr 
1. Dexia France 357.210.000 Fundacion Bancaria Caixa D 
Estalvis I Pensions De 
Barcelona 
356.518.288 
2. Nordea Bank Finland Plc 341.947.000 Caixabank, S.A. 344.255.475 
3. Banco Popolare - Società 
Cooperativa-Banco Popolare 
131.921.384 Credit Suisse Securities 
(Europe) Ltd 
131.847.150 
4. Nordea Bank Danmark Group-
Nordea Bank Danmark A/S 
113.196.385 Raiffeisen Bank International 
AG 
114.426.583 
5. Nordea Bank Norge ASA 79.157.767 Caisse Francaise de 
Financement Local 
79.061.000 
6. Banca Popolare di Milano 
SCaRL 
52.475.005 Yorkshire Building Society 52.021.805 
7. Banca popolare dell'Etruria e del 
Lazio Soc. coop. 
11.534.308 Crédit Mutuel de Maine-Anjou 
et Basse-Normandie SA 
14.322.676 
8. Investkredit Bank AG 14.332.541 JP Morgan Bank Luxembourg 
SA 
11.508.972 
9. Asya Katilim Bankasi AS-Bank 
Asya 
7.081.207 Bank Saint-Petersburg PJSC 7.089.515 
10. BNP Paribas Bank Polska SA 5.093.591 Société de promotion et de 
participation pour la coopération 
économique SA-Proparco 
5.095.119 
11. Bank Petrocommerce 4.793.187 Sparebanken Sogn og Fjordane 4.789.267 
12. Probusiness Bank OAO 3.452.030 RBC Capital Markets Arbitrage 
S.A. 
3.452.245 
13. DAB Bank AG 3.406.192 DB UK Bank Limited 3.405.309 
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14. Banca di Trento e Bolzano 
Societa per Azioni - Bank Fuer 
Trient und Bozen-BTB SpA 
2.901.892 CartaSi SpA 2.901.084 
15. Corporate Commercial Bank AD 2.067.827 Sparkasse Waldeck Frankenberg 2.069.332 
16. Finance and Credit Bank PJSC 2.067.713 Caisse régionale de crédit 
agricole mutuel de la Martinique 
2.067.744 
17. Cassa di Risparmio di Savona 
SpA 
1.914.913 Caja Rural de Burgos, 
Fuentepelayo, Segovia Y 
Castelldans SCC 
1.914.289 
18. Immorent-Bank GmbH 1.839.350 Turkland Bank AS-T- Bank 1.836.527 
19. Cassa di risparmio di Rieti SpA 1.529.327 VR-Bank Neu-Ulm eG 1.529.630 
20. Brokbusinessbank JSB 1.486.760 Sparkasse Freising 1.486.446 
21. Crediveneto Credito 
Cooperativo-Credito 
Cooperativo Interprovinciale 
Veneto 
1.349.249 Volksbank eG Warendorf 1.347.703 
22. Cassa di risparmio della 
provincia di Viterbo SpA 
1.322.799 Banque des Antilles françaises 
SA-BDAF 
1.322.751 
23. Bank Forum 1.317.230 Caja Rural de Teruel Sociedad 
Cooperativa de Crédito 
1.317.419 
24. Public Joint Stock Company 
'Kreditprombank' 
1.209.878 PSD Bank Niederbayern-
Oberpfalz eG 
1.210.472 
25. Banca Cesare Ponti SpA 892.050 Credito di Romagna SpA 891.014 
26. Banca della Bergamasca - 
Credito Cooperativo Scarl 
883.051 Raiffeisenbank Bündner 
Rheintal Genossenschaft 
883.345 
27. Unionbank EAD 879.832 Banca di Credito Cooperativo di 
San Marzano di San Giuseppe 
(Taranto) 
879.021 
28. Banca di Rimini - Credito 
Cooperativo 
865.574 Volksbank Franken eG 866.210 
29. Cassa di risparmio di 
Civitavecchia SpA 
826.920 Cassa Rurale di Lavis - Valle di 
Cembra Banca di Credito 
Cooperativo 
826.560 
30. Public Joint Stock Company 
Omega Bank 
814.419 Credito Valdinievole Banca di 
Credito Cooperativo di 
montecatini Terme E Bientina 
Societa Cooperativa 
814.145 
31. Cassa Rurale di Aldeno e Cadine 
- Banca di Credito Cooperativo 
796.110 Caixa Rural Galega Sociedad 
Cooperativa de Crédito Limitada 
Gallega 
797.179 
32. Waldviertler Sparkasse von 1842 
eV 
765.216 Friulovest Banca Credito 
Cooperativo Societa 
Cooperativa 
767.430 
33. Public Joint Stock Company 
"Imexbank 
706.509 Sparkasse Parchim-Lübz 706.529 
34. Banca di Bedizzole Turano 
Valvestino Credito cooperativo 
Societa Cooperativa 
694.359 Clientis Bank Toggenburg AG 694.777 
35. Banca di Credito Cooperativo di 
Signa 
614.538 International Asset Bank AD 614.906 
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36. Sparkasse Kremstal-Pyhrn AG 589.162 Raiffeisenbank Willisau-Gettnau 589.616 
37. Weinviertler Sparkasse AG 570.265 Closed Joint Stock Company 
Alfa Bank-Alfa-Bank 
570.007 
38. Banca di Credito Cooperativo 
Orobica di Bariano e Cologno al 
Serio 
562.302 Raiffeisen-Regionalbank 
Gaenserndorf eGen 
562.711 
39. Sparkasse Hartberg-Vorau 554.148 Bank fuer Aerzte und Freie 
Berufe AG 
554.184 
40. JSB Kyivska Rus 545.964 Ulricehamns Sparbank 545.749 
41. Cassa Rurale Pinetana Formace e 
Seregnano - Banca di Credito 
Cooperativo 
510.772 Banque Raiffeisen Sarine-Ouest 510.118 
42. Banca del Mugello Credito 
Cooperativo SCRL 
454.507 Spar-und Leihkasse Riggisberg 454.994 
43. Volksbank Altheim-Braunau 
rGmbH 
404.460 Raiffeisenbank Region 
Gallneukirchen eGen (mbH) 
404.063 
44. Bancasciano Credito 
Cooperativo 
387.131 Raiffeisenbank Aesch-
Pfeffingen BL 
389.710 
45. Banca di Treviso SpA 365.760 Raiffeisenbank Wels Sued eGen 
(mbH) 
365.190 
46. Cassa Rurale ed Artigiana di 
Treviso - Credito Cooperativo 
364.341 Caja Rural de Gijon Cooperativa 
de Credito 
364.833 
47. Cassa Rurale di Caldonazzo - 
Banca di Credito Cooperativo 
344.021 Totalbanken A/S 344.319 
48. Cassa Rurale di Mori - 
Brentonico- Val di Gresta Banca 
di Credito Cooperativo 
319.494 ProCredit Bank AD 319.100 
49. RCI Bank AG 314.745 Raiffeisenbank Flachsmeer eG 314.394 
50. Public Joint-Stock Company 
'Ukrainian Business Bank'-
UkrBusinessBank 
302.023 Lipetskkombank-Lipetsk 
Commercial Bank 
302.903 
51. Raiffeisenbank Region 
Schaerding registrierte 
Genossenschaft mit beschränkter 
Haftung 
280.040 Raiffeisen Privatbank 
Liechtenstein AG 
281.948 
52. Raiffeisenbank Goetzis 
Registrierte Genossenschaft Mit 
Beschraenkter Haftung 
278.336 Rabobank A.S. 278.491 
53. Banca di Credito Cooperativo 
Valle Seriana 
253.052 Raiffeisenbank Däniken-
Gretzenbach Genossenschaft 
253.527 
54. Raiffeisenbank Lustenau rGmbH 248.565 Fortuna Banque s.c. 248.994 
55. Public Joint Stock Company 
'Commercial Bank 
'Pivdenkombank' 
246.413 Vakif Finans Faktoring 
Hizmetleri AS 
246.448 
56. Eurogasbank, Ltd 232.904 Bürgschaftsbank Baden-
Württemberg GmbH 
232.768 
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57. Volksbank Aichfeld-Murboden 
rGmbH 
224.796 Ivetofta Sparbank i Bromölla 224.784 
58. Banca Sociala SA 218.754 Raiffeisenbank Gramastetten-
Herzogsdorf eGen 
218.794 
59. Expobank JSC 211.994 Closed Joint Stock Company 
«Trade Capital Bank» 
211.862 
60. Public Joint Stock Company 
'Bank 'Tavrika' 
195.650 Raiffeisen Leasing D.O.O. 195.660 
61. Cassa Rurale di Levico Terme - 
Banca di Credito Cooperativo 
192.610 American Bank of Investments 192.949 
62. Raiffeisenkasse Ebreichsdorf 
rGmbH 
187.746 Borgun HF 187.815 
63. Raiffeisenbank 
Unterpremstaetten eGen 
186.091 Raiffeisenbank 
Schrobenhausener Land Eg 
186.346 
64. Public Joint Stock Company 
'Bank Cambio' 
183.996 Caixa De Crédito Agrícola 
Mútuo Do Alentejo Central, 
C.R.L. 
183.886 
65. Sparkasse Kirchschlag 171.178 Raiffeisenbank Beilngries eG 171.748 
66. Public Joint Stock Company 
'Aktabank' 
152.542 ABC Arbitrage SA 152.622 
67. Public Joint Stock Company 
'Bank 'Demark' 
147.686 Raiffeisenbank Axams- 
Grinzens reg.Gen.mbH - 
Hauptanstalt Axams 
147.578 
68. Public Joint-Stock Company 
'Bank Pershyi' 
146.423 Cassa Raiffeisen Alta Venosta-
Raiffeisenkasse Obervintschgau 
146.433 
69. Volksbank Voecklamarkt-
Mondsee rGmbH 
140.892 HFC Bank Limited 140.881 
70. Public Joint-Stock Company 
'Terra Bank' 
136.315 Komercijalna banka ad Banja 
Luka 
136.641 
71. Cassa Rurale di Brentonico - 
Banca di Credito Cooperativo 
128.418 Hvidbjerg Bank Aktieselskab 128.378 
72. Banca della Tuscia Credito 
Cooperativo Scrl 
124.119 Reisjärven Osuuspankki 124.449 
73. Caja de Credito Cooperativo 119.521 Raiffeisenbank eG Flieden 119.593 
74. Mercury Bank Public Joint-Stock 
Company 
113.661 Raiffeisenbank Im Grabfeld EG 113.496 
75. Oesterreichische 
Verkehrskreditbank 
113.160 TTK Banka AD Skopje 113.409 
76. Banca di Credito Cooperativo del 
Lametino 
108.792 Banca di Credito Cooperativo di 
Basciano 
108.776 
77. Delta Bank Joint-Stock 
Company 
103.294 Uglemetbank OAO 103.290 
78. Public Joint Stock Company 
'Commercial Bank 'Daniel' 
100.754 Concorde Securities Ltd 100.576 
79. Union Standard Bank 97.719 Raiffeisenbank Mittelschwaben 
eG 
97.594 
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80. Raiffeisenbank Im Weinviertel -
Hohenruppersdorf, Reg 
93.678 A & T Finansal Kiralama A.S 93.671 
81. Stadtsparkasse Traiskirchen 93.233 Russky Investitsionny Alyans 93.328 
82. Public Joint-Stock Company 
'Zakhidinkombank' 
82.738 Banca Popolare Lecchese Spa 82.493 
83. Public Joint-Stock Company 
'Avtokrazbank' 
80.853 eQ Plc 80.896 
84. BCC Alto Casertano e Basso 
Frusinate 
76.760 Public Joint Stock Company 
'Unicombank' 
76.858 
85. Public Joint Stock Company 
'Commercial Bank 'Ukrainian 
Financial World' 
75.547 Raiffeisenbank Fraenkisches 
Weinland eG 
76.171 
86. Contract Bank 62.390 Cassa Raiffeisen di Nalles - 
Raiffeisenkasse Nals 
62.551 
87. Public Joint Stock Company 
'Starokievskiy Bank' 
50.088 Grameen Credit Agricole 
Microfinance Foundation 
50.151 
88. Raiffeisenbank St Ulrich am 
Pillersee eGen 
50.003 Raiffeisenkasse Dobersberg-
Waldkirchen Reg. 
Genossenschaft Mit 
50.145 
89. Banka Splitsko-Dalmatinska dd 
Split 
45.449 Raiffeisenbank Apetlon Egen 45.430 
90. Public Joint-Stock Company 
'Finrostbank' 
43.576 Raiffeisenbank Schlierbach 
eGen (mbH) 
43.540 
91. Belarusian Bank for Small 
Business 
43.301 Raiffeisenbank St. Florian am 
Inn eGen (mbH) 
43.345 
92. Cassa Rurale di Strembo, 
Bocenago e Caderzone - Banca 
di Credito Cooperativo 
43.030 Ziraat Bank (Moscow) CJS 43.005 
93. Coface Austria Bank AG 42.803 Komercijalno-Investiciona 
Banka dd Velika Kladusa 
42.855 
94. Public Joint-Stock Company 
Commercial Bank 'Interbank' 
42.019 Butterfield Holdings (UK) Ltd 42.117 
95. Public Joint Stock Company 
'Joint Stock Bank 'Ukoopspilka' 
40.789 Joint Stock Company 
Eurotorginvestbank 
40.778 
96. Public Joint Stock Company 
Commercial Bank Axiom 
38.979 Raiffeisenbank Moosburg - 
Tigring reg.Gen.m.b.H. 
38.805 
97. Public Joint Stock Company 
'Legbank' 
37.877 PJSC 'Bank Unison' 37.861 
98. Real Bank PAT 36.154 Uralsky Mezhregionalny Bank 
OOO 
36.193 
99. Public Joint Stock Company 
'Commercial Bank 
Promekonombank' 
35.770 Dero Bank Ag 35.483 
100. Profin Bank Pjsc 32.447 WKBG Wiener 
Kreditbuergschafts und 
Beteiligungsbank AG 
32.423 
101. Belarussian Industrial Bank 27.750 Public Joint Stock Company 
Bank 'Trust' 
27.743 
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102. Bankhaus Jungholz International 
Private Banking AG 
27.078 Banca Di Credito Cooperativo 
Di Rivarolo Canavese, Rivara 
Ed Enti Territoriali Locali 
27.211 
103. Bankprivat Ag 21.745 Raiffeisenbank Dienten reg. 
Gen.mbH 
21.708 
104. Public Joint Stock Company 
'Green Bank' 
18.801 Banco de Promocion de 
Negocios SA 
18.897 
105. Banca di Credito Cooperativo di 
Vigevano Società Cooperativa 
17.103 KSG Bank 17.198 
106. Public Joint-Stock Company 
'PRIME-BANK' 
16.891 Lazard & co Gmbh 16.835 
107. Public Joint Stock Company 
'Bank Veles' 
15.700 Public Joint-Stock Company 
'Commercial Bank 'Accordbank' 
15.796 
108. ONE Bank GmbH 5.294 Public Joint Stock Company 
'Bank Alliance' 
5.358 
109. Valore Italia Holding 4.302 Ansbacher & Co Limited 4.484 
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